## **EXHIBIT E**

the complaint, but not those that are in the preliminary statement. However, it seems like we have agreement between the parties as to what is and is not proper for the Court to consider on a 12(c) motion.

THE COURT: I will speak about this a little bit later on, sir, but I'm sort of hinting to the folks at the front table that I really don't want a motion to strike. I am really not convinced that we need to do a motion to strike, and I am not sure it's going to save anybody any time, but you will be able to persuade me of the contrary or not later on in this proceeding.

Sir, what I am told by the defense is, fine, I am not going to consider the stuff I can't consider. But if I can consider the stuff within the universe of appropriate 12(c) materials, I am going to find that your complaint should be dismissed because you have not properly alleged that these cryptoassets are in fact securities or that they are investment contracts or that somehow the conduct taking place on the Coinbase exchange is within the federal securities laws.

I would like to understand, because I think it is presented to me as a matter of optics, yet it is of interest to me. How do you -- and by you, I mean your clients -- contextualize Mr. Gensler's testimony? How do you contextualize what he was saying about the absence of market regulation of cryptoassets?

Is it your view that actually -- I understand, I think, that you are suggesting that this wasn't estoppel and that perhaps minds could be changed or maybe better arguments could be made. But he did seem to suggest, and I thought he was speaking for the commission when he did so, that the SEC could not or did not regulate transactions of this type. What has changed?

MR. MANCUSO: Your Honor, I think what we have to go back to is to the actual context of that quote, and I am sure your Honor has read it beyond just the snippet that is taken out and put in the answer.

THE COURT: I have.

MR. MANCUSO: However, I think if we go back to the actual transcript and you see that the question was asked, I believe it involved Bitcoin, which is not at issue here, and the SEC has made clear that that's not the focus of any of these enforcement actions.

Also, I believe it was a congressman from the House of Representatives who said, what can we do to make this safer? I don't have it in front of me, the whole quote. But from what I remember, it was what can we do to make this market more robust so that people -- the way I interpreted it is so people trust it.

Mr. Gensler said a couple of things about the unregulated nature. There is no regulator in this space,

meaning no one is currently regulating it. I think taking, there is no regulator in this space out of context and just throwing it in the answer is a nice soundbite, but it doesn't necessarily mean that the chair committed the SEC to not, at some point, based on some conduct that violates the securities law, bring an enforcement action.

That's another thing that I think dovetails with the major questions doctrine, is that the SEC is not attempting to regulate all of the crypto industry in this country or around the world. We regulate conduct, and we are regulating Coinbase's conduct, which we believe violates the law.

And if you look and you kind of synthesize all of Coinbase's arguments, they are basically saying, in terms of the equitable arguments, what Mr. Gensler had said, the major questions doctrine, they are saying that if the SEC or some other criminal authority is looking at conduct of a crypto actor and it violates the securities law or some other law, that they don't have authority to do that because Congress hasn't given it yet. That's just incorrect and that, we believe, to be a nonsensical argument. So I think that these all have to be looked at together, and that would be my response to how the Court should view it.

THE COURT: Are defendants correct, and I think the answer is yes to this, that the commission is not considering Bitcoin or Ether to be securities, cryptoassets from Bitcoin or

that this would not later be found to be a security.

THE COURT: Let's just pause so I can just sort of get rid of the skepticism I currently have as I hear that answer.

I am not saying that the commission should be omniscient at the time it's evaluating a registration statement and that it should know all things. But I would have thought the commission was doing diligence into what Coinbase was doing, and somehow I thought that it would say, you know, you really shouldn't do this. This is violative of the securities laws, or we are kind of in some interesting unchartered territory here with respect to whether the assets on your platform are securities, so be forewarned that maybe some day there could be a problem.

I hear what you are saying, which is, I shouldn't give it any consideration and it doesn't absolve the defendants of any of the securities laws. Yet I'm just wondering why it is that the commission saw fit to bless what they were doing, because that is kind of what they did by issuing the S-1, and that there not be any discussion about the possibility of violative conduct. Again, you may be right, but I am just viewing your answer with a measure of skepticism.

MR. MANCUSO: Understood, your Honor.

Respectfully, I would take issue again with the word blessing their conduct or their business. This is about disclosures. In fact, and I think we lay it out in our

complaint, that Coinbase disclosed in their S-1 that the risk that the assets that are being traded on their platform could be found to be securities, and that came from the process back and forth between --

THE COURT: You never could have said to them, hey, you guys need to register as a securities exchange. That was within the power of the SEC to do, was it not?

MR. MANCUSO: I can't really speak to that.

THE COURT: I think it was. I don't think anything stopped the commission from doing it. I am not suggesting, sir, that this is dispositive or that there is an estoppel issue. But it's not crazy in the Failla parlance for Coinbase to think that what they were doing was OK because it was exactly what you let them do when they issued the S-1. That's the point I'm making. You may say that they and I are reading too much into the issuance of the S-1.

MR. MANCUSO: I'd agree with that.

THE COURT: I might disagree with that, but I do understand.

Eventually, sir, we are going to get to the major questions doctrine, but let me ask you. You have heard me engage with Mr. Savitt in discussions about the arguments that they contemplate making. I have certainly seen your responses, at least as they are in writing. Is there something else that you want me to know or do you wish to engage at a more granular

level with any of the responses that Mr. Savitt gave me this morning?

MR. MANCUSO: Your Honor, if we are not going to talk about the major questions doctrine -- and you would like to talk about secondary trading or their reasons for moving to dismiss -- if that was it, I will defer to my colleague to handle those.

THE COURT: Are you coming back for major questions doctrine?

MR. MANCUSO: I will be coming back, unless you want to hear about that now.

THE COURT: I will wait. Thank you so much.

MR. MANCUSO: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. MARGIDA: Thank you, your Honor.

I don't want to belabor this because I think the positions of the parties are fairly set out in the letters.

I do want to point out that what Coinbase is doing with respect to reading into Howey a contract requirement is very interesting. They acknowledge that Howey says an investment contract can be a contract transaction or a scheme, and in their letter they say the transaction or scheme, yeah, but associated contractual undertakings. Today I think Mr. Savitt's phrase was schemes of related contracts.

The SEC's position is that's just wrong as a matter of law. No court in 75 plus years has held that *Howey* requires a

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common law contract. Howey itself said the paper or the financial instrument is incidental. Courts in this circuit, including Gary Plastic and Glen-Arden, have looked at what Howey compels, which is the economic reality of the transaction. They have looked at the series and collection of inducements, representations, what they are selling, the enterprise.

And Judge Castel in Telegram says, scheme is used in a descriptive, not a pejorative sense. And Coinbase seems to ignore the fact that courts are actually finding cryptoassets to be securities where there is no contract. Balestra v. ATBCOIN in this court is an example of that where there is no contract.

In Telegram, Judge Castel is very clear -- and I know it was in the context of, the Court found there was one continuous offering, but the Court also found that there is no ongoing -- there is no ongoing privity between what happens in like public market sales. So there is an initial offer to 175 initial purchasers and Telegram finds -- and this relates to the secondary market transaction argument -- Telegram envisioned that there would eventually be secondary sales, and there is no distinction -- I'll get to that point in a minute.

On LBRY, we think it speaks for itself. Putting aside any examination of the transcript, I think the Court itself draws no distinction between primary and secondary

transactions. The '33 and the '34 Acts draw no such distinction. There are no such distinctions drawn in other securities market contexts, and Coinbase offers no compelling reason why we should draw one here.

Commonality -- I think Mr. Savitt was hitting on like investing in an enterprise. Commonality, as your Honor knows, is about tying -- if you're talking about horizontal commonality, it's tying the fortunes of investors together, and then strict vertical commonality is about tying the enterprise itself, the people who are running the platform or network or the issuers together with investors. We have alleged in our complaint, and they have to be taken as true at this stage, that those elements are satisfied.

The fortunes of an investor who buys a cryptoasset security, including one of the 13 that we have alleged here -- and, by the way, your Honor, the commission has spoken on other cryptoassets that are available that the commission thinks are securities. The Wahi litigation, insider trading litigation, named specific assets. Coinbase didn't delist any of those, except for one later when the relevant platform became defunct. We also identify in paragraph 124 of the complaint other assets that the commission has brought enforcement actions on.

The argument that the commission hasn't spoken until now with this complaint about assets being securities on Coinbase's platform is just not true.

I don't want to belabor this, but coming back to your Honor's question from earlier this morning about the reasonable expectation of profits based on the efforts of others, someone who purchases in an initial offering on a Monday, versus on a secondary platform the following week, has the same expectation of profit based on the representations of the issuers, the promoters and the developers, so I think that's pretty clearly alleged in our complaint as well.

If your Honor has other questions about the *Howey* related aspects, but I think our position is well set out, and we look forward to briefing the issues.

THE COURT: On the issue of staking, in listening to Mr. Savitt, I began thinking that the parties had completely different views of the staking program. Because the way it was being described to me by him suggested more. I believe he used the word administrative. I guess the defendants are suggesting that it's sort of a means of verifying trades and transactions and, again, something almost back office-y, although there is perhaps a profit-generating element to it as well.

Is it that you just hold two different views as to what the staking program is? Has your position been clarified by Mr. Savitt's comments to me this morning? And if not, what's violative about the staking program?

MR. MARGIDA: I am really confused about Coinbase's decision to move for judgment on the pleadings with respect to